



REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN UKRAINE

1 December 2024 – 31 May 2025

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
30 June 2025

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UKRAINE: UN HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MISSION IN UKRAINE

As of 31 May 2025



The boundaries and names shown and designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Conflict-related violence killed 968 civilians and injured 4,807 between 1 December 2024 and 31 May 2025, a 37 per cent increase compared with the same period last year. The vast majority of casualties occurred in territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine as a result of military operations by the Russian armed forces to acquire control by force of further territory along the frontline, the use of explosive weapons with wide area effect in urban areas across the country, and the increased use of short-range combat drones. Russian armed forces struck at least five hospitals directly in the reporting period, some of them with multiple munitions.
2. In a growing number of cases, unidentified persons contacted children in Ukraine over social media and offered them money to commit acts of sabotage, including through acts of arson and deployment of improvised explosive devices, against Ukrainian military targets and civilians. Some children were killed carrying out these acts; others were detained and face serious criminal charges.
3. Widespread violations against Ukrainian soldiers captured by Russian armed forces continued. OHCHR documented credible allegations that Russian armed forces executed at least 35 captured Ukrainian soldiers during the reporting period, consistent with the increasing number of documented executions since late August 2024. Recently released Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) also provided detailed accounts of recent use of torture and ill-treatment, including sexual violence, and dire detention conditions in facilities managed by the Russian Federation and confirmed previous findings of widespread and systematic use of torture and ill-treatment. Released Ukrainian civilian detainees held by Russian authorities also described torture, ill-treatment and dire conditions of detention, confirming previously established patterns.
4. POWs held by Ukraine recounted torture and ill-treatment in transit places before arrival at official places of internment.
5. In territory of Ukraine occupied by the Russian Federation, Russian authorities increased pressure on residents to obtain Russian citizenship or to leave, with new laws and decrees restricting access to, for example, pensions and health care for people without Russian citizenship or permanent residency. Russian occupying authorities imposed administrative fines on residents of occupied territory for legitimate expressions of Ukrainian cultural identity, or for criticizing the authorities, and they accelerated efforts to expropriate private property, mainly belonging to displaced Ukrainians, in violation of international humanitarian law (IHL).
6. In territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, the authorities continued to prosecute Ukrainians on charges of collaboration for work that can be lawfully compelled by the occupying Power under IHL. Men also continued to be denied the right to conscientious objection. Older persons and persons with disabilities continued to face barriers in evacuating from dangerous areas and in accessing adequate and affordable housing once displaced. They also remained at high risk of institutionalization.

II. OHCHR METHODOLOGY


7. This report is based on the work of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU).¹ In the reporting period, HRMMU conducted 186 field visits, 48 visits to places of detention, and 48 visits to collective centres for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and hospitals, monitored 20 trial hearings, and interviewed 1,879 victims and witnesses of alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as their relatives and lawyers, Government officials, members of civil society and other interlocutors.² The report also draws from court documents, official records, and other relevant material, including from open sources.

¹HRMMU was deployed on 14 March 2014 to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout Ukraine, with particular attention to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, and to propose recommendations to the Government and other actors to address human rights concerns. For more information, see A/HRC/27/75, paras. 7-8.

²In total, OHCHR interviewed 977 men, 864 women, 29 boys and 9 girls in the reporting period.

8. Verification of alleged violations in occupied territory of Ukraine remained often complicated or delayed because of multiple challenges. The Russian Federation has not granted OHCHR access for independent monitoring despite repeated requests. Individuals face difficulty moving from occupied territory to territory controlled by Ukraine due to the absence of crossing points, numerous checkpoints in occupied territory, and the need to travel vast distances through the Russian Federation. Also, many people are hesitant to share accounts via telephone or electronic messaging services out of concern that conversations may be overheard or intercepted.

OHCHR ACTIVITIES IN THE REPORTING PERIOD




Creation Date: 25 June 2025 Source: OHCHR HRMMU

9. Findings are included in the report where they meet the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard: namely where, based on a body of verified information, an ordinarily prudent observer would have reasonable grounds to believe that the facts took place as described, and where legal conclusions are drawn, that these facts meet all the elements of a violation.

III. IMPACT OF HOSTILITIES ON THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

10. Continued intense fighting in frontline areas, Russian missile and combined munitions attacks in urban areas, and high levels of short-range drone attacks, contributed to high numbers of civilian casualties in the reporting period. While December 2024 and February 2025 saw relatively lower levels of civilians killed and injured, March and April 2025 marked an escalation, with casualty figures comparable to those recorded in September–October 2024. With at least 968 civilians killed and 4,807 injured (3,108 men, 2,363 women, 167 boys and 137 girls), the number of civilian casualties was 37 per cent higher than in the same period 12 months earlier (904 killed and 3,314 injured). The casualties included 22 staff of medical institutions, 9 humanitarian workers, and 24 emergency service workers. Most civilian casualties (95 per cent; 918 killed and 4,557 injured) occurred in territory controlled by Ukraine, while 5 per cent (50 killed and 250 injured) occurred in territory occupied by the Russian Federation.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES SINCE 24 FEBRUARY 2022,* BY MONTH




Creation Date: 25 June 2025 Source: OHCHR HRMMU

11. Russian authorities reported that 99 civilians were killed and 648 injured in attacks launched by the Ukrainian armed forces in 11 regions of the Russian Federation. OHCHR has established the identity of some of them; however, the circumstances of the incidents remain subject to verification due to lack of access and limited publicly available information.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, BY AGE AND SEX

From 1 December 2024 to 31 May 2025



Creation Date: 25 June 2025 Source: OHCHR HRMMU

A. Use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas

12. The continuing use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in urban areas accounted for a large number of the civilian casualties in the reporting period. In particular, missiles, loitering munitions, and air-dropped bombs accounted for 46 per cent of civilian casualties in Ukraine, most of them in urban areas.
13. IHL requires parties to a conflict to use means or methods of combat that in the prevailing circumstances are not likely to strike military and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.³ It also requires the parties to take all feasible precautions to avoid or minimize incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects, including by verifying that targets are lawful military objectives, and by choosing tactics and weapons that would avoid or at the very least minimize incidental loss of civilian life.⁴ The extensive use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas is generally incompatible with the principles of proportionality and precaution under IHL and the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks, given the foreseeable risk of extensive civilian harm and the indiscriminate effects such weapons produce in densely populated areas.

Attacks with airburst fragmentation warheads

14. In at least three attacks, Russian armed forces deployed missiles with fragmentation warheads that detonated above ground, scattering fragments across large open areas and killing 52 civilians (20 men, 21 women, 9 boys and 2 girls) and injuring 270 (155 women, 84 men, 16 girls and 15 boys). Using this type of weapon in a densely populated area at times and in circumstances that would foreseeably kill or wound many civilians, including children, likely constitutes an indiscriminate attack.
15. On 4 April 2025, just before 7 p.m., a ballistic missile launched by Russian armed forces detonated in the air above a park, playground, and restaurant in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk region, dispersing thousands of fragments across the residential area. The attack killed 20 civilians (8 men, 3 women, 7 boys, and 2 girls), most of whom were in the playground at the time. Another 63 civilians, including at least 11 children, were injured. This was the single deadliest strike for children verified by OHCHR since the start of the full-scale invasion.
16. The Russian Ministry of Defence acknowledged the attack, claiming it targeted Ukrainian and foreign military personnel at the restaurant. OHCHR conducted multiple site visits, interviewed residents, witnesses and restaurant staff, and reviewed video footage from before and during the attack, and found no indication of any military presence at the site.
17. In another attack, two ballistic missiles launched by Russian armed forces struck the historic centre of Sumy city minutes apart on the morning of 13 April 2025, a religious holiday when many people were outside on the streets. The first missile struck the Sumy State University building while the second detonated in the air, approximately 200 meters away, scattering fragments across a wide area. The Russian Ministry of Defence acknowledged the attack, claiming it targeted a gathering of Ukrainian military personnel. OHCHR verified that the two strikes killed at least 31 civilians (18 women, 11 men, and 2 boys) and injured 105 (57 women, 34 men, 7 boys and 7 girls). OHCHR also established that most of the casualties resulted from the second strike, mainly civilians who were walking on the street or traveling on a bus, and people attempting to help the victims of the first strike.

Attacks with cluster munitions

18. OHCHR documented several attacks involving cluster munitions, in both occupied territory and territory controlled by Ukraine. The use of cluster munitions in populated areas is incompatible with IHL due to their inherently indiscriminate nature.
19. For example, on the evening of 7 March 2025, several munitions struck a residential area in Dobropillia, Donetsk region, killing 11 civilians (7 men and 4 women) and injuring 48 (21 men, 21 women, 3 boys, and 3 girls). OHCHR determined that Russian armed forces used at least three different weapons in the attack,

³Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, art. 51, ICRC Customary Rule 12.

⁴Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, art. 57.

including a ballistic missile that struck a market, and rockets from a Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Based on a site visit, interviews with witnesses, and assessment of weapons remnants, OHCHR concluded that the MLRS system likely deployed cluster munitions, which caused a significant number of the casualties.

20. The Russian occupying authorities also reported the use by Ukraine of cluster munitions in occupied territory, mainly in Horlivka, Donetsk region. While OHCHR has not been able to verify the weapons used in every attack and the reported civilian casualties [see above para. 8], photos and videos of the explosions and pattern of damage were, in several instances, consistent with the use of cluster munitions. For example, available photo and video materials suggest that cluster munitions, reportedly deployed through two 155 mm artillery shells, exploded in a civilian area of Horlivka on 31 January 2025, injuring at least six civilians.

B. Increased civilian casualties from short-range drones

21. Attacks using short-range drones⁵ killed at least 207 civilians and injured 1,365 in the reporting period. From December 2024 through February 2025, such attacks caused more civilian casualties in Ukraine than any other weapon.
22. Around 96 per cent of the civilian casualties due to short-range drones (190 killed, 1,314 injured) occurred in territory controlled by Ukraine. While such drones killed and injured civilians along the entire frontline, OHCHR documented that the largest number of casualties occurred in and around Kherson city. In the single deadliest attack, a drone dropped a munition on a bus transporting workers of a mining company to work on the morning of 23 April in Marhanets, Dnipropetrovsk region, killing 10 civilians (8 women and 2 men), and injuring at least 57 (34 women and 23 men). Around 4 per cent of civilian casualties from short-range drones occurred in territory occupied by the Russian Federation (17 killed, 51 injured).
23. Short-range drone attacks killed or injured civilians while they were riding motorbikes or bicycles, travelling in private passenger cars, public buses or ambulances, while delivering humanitarian aid, conducting evacuations, walking outdoors or standing on their own property outside their homes. Given the first-person-view capability of such drones, which allows the operators to observe potential targets in real time, the high number of civilian casualties suggests that the operators failed to take all necessary precautions to verify the military nature of the target, or that they deliberately targeted civilians, an act that would constitute a war crime.
24. The constant threat of drone attacks exacerbated an already dire humanitarian situation along the frontline, particularly in Government-controlled areas of Kherson region, limiting movement and the provision of essential services and utilities. Attacks on humanitarian assistance and medical vehicles affected the delivery of essential aid and emergency support.

C. Attacks on hospitals

25. During the reporting period, Russian armed forces struck functioning healthcare facilities on at least five occasions. On 10 December 2024, a ballistic missile struck a building housing two private medical facilities in Zaporizhzhia city, killing 11 civilians (8 women and 3 men), including four medical staff, and injuring 20 civilians (12 women, 7 men and 1 girl). On 20 December 2024, two guided aerial glide bombs hit the Kherson Regional Oncological Center while at least 15 people, including patients and medical staff, were inside. Although staff and patients had safely taken shelter, the attacks caused serious damage to the hospital.
26. In three incidents, hospitals were struck by multiple loitering munitions. On 14 March 2025, three loitering munitions struck a hospital in Zolochiv, Kharkiv region. The same facility was struck again on 27 March 2025 by two loitering munitions. On 19 March 2025, at least five loitering munitions struck a hospital in Krasnopillia, Sumy region. Both hospitals were damaged, the Krasnopillia hospital significantly so. The repeated strikes

⁵For more information on these weapons, see OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 September – 30 November 2024", December 2024.

against the two hospitals suggest that they may have been attacked deliberately. Medical facilities enjoy special protection under IHL.⁶

D. Attacks on energy infrastructure

27. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented a total of 115 attacks on energy infrastructure across Ukraine. Most of these attacks (91) occurred in territory controlled by Ukraine. This is a 42 per cent decrease compared with the previous six-month period.
28. Russian armed forces conducted four large-scale, coordinated attacks against energy infrastructure on 13 and 25 December 2024, 15 January and 7 March 2025. These attacks followed 11 similar large-scale attacks between March and November 2024. Attacks in the reporting period more frequently targeted natural gas infrastructure, resulting in damage to facilities and disruption of gas supplies to the civilian population. OHCHR documented 21 attacks on gas infrastructure in the reporting period, compared to five in the previous six-month period.
29. From March 2025, attacks on energy facilities by Russian armed forces shifted focus from large-scale, nationwide strikes to targeting specific regions of the country. For example, Russian armed forces attacked energy infrastructure in Odesa region for five consecutive days in early March. The attacks resulted in temporary power outages. From mid-March to mid-April, the number of attacks decreased, coinciding with announcements of ceasefires on such attacks; however, they did not stop entirely.
30. In occupied territory, Ukrainian armed forces attacked energy facilities on at least 24 occasions. Most of the attacks (21) occurred in the areas close to the zone of active hostilities in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. For example, on 5 March, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack on a power substation in the occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia region left several settlements temporarily without electricity.

E. Use of children in armed conflict

31. Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, OHCHR has recorded credible allegations that the Russian Federation used Ukrainian children in Government-controlled territory to conduct surveillance and transmit information on the Ukrainian military, or to commit acts of sabotage and arson targeting military objectives or public property with links to the military.⁷ Most cases followed a similar pattern: individuals contacted boys and girls over social media and instructed them to set fire to objects, such as vehicles belonging to members of the military or railway equipment. They promised to pay the children after receiving video proof of the arson. The Ukrainian authorities reported an increase in such incidents in 2024, which continued during the reporting period. According to the Office the Prosecutor General, criminal proceedings were initiated against 95 minors (72 boys and 23 girls) on national security grounds between 1 December 2024 and 31 May 2025.⁸
32. Though this method of contact is designed to obfuscate responsibility, the content and context of the messages suggested that those responsible were linked to the Russian Federation. In some cases, Ukrainian law enforcement explicitly reported that they had linked the recruiters to the Russian Federation based on the use of Russian phone numbers, the type of tasks or sensitive information requested (e.g. monitoring of radio waves, movement and location of Ukrainian armed forces), and the fact that locations shared by recruiters were subsequently targeted by Russian armed forces.
33. Since the end of 2024, the tasks given to children became significantly more violent, escalating to manufacturing or planting improvised explosive devices (IED). The Office of the Prosecutor General reported

⁶Geneva Convention IV, art. 18; Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I), arts. 12 and 48; ICRC IHL Customary Rules 7 and 28.

⁷See OHCHR "The impact of the armed conflict and occupation on children's rights in Ukraine", para. 69.

⁸Information received from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine.

that it had identified the involvement of 19 boys and 4 girls in such activities as instructed by recruiters in the reporting period.⁹

34. For example, after a 16-year-old girl posted a job request message with her age on social media, a Russian-speaking man sent her voice messages offering money to set vehicles on fire or deliver explosives to a military conscription office or other Ukrainian State institutions in Odesa region. He provided instructions on the incendiary material to use, how to carry out the arson, and identified the car to be torched, which the girl later learned belonged to the Ukrainian military conscription office. When the girl ultimately refused to carry out the act, after initially agreeing, the man continued to pressure her, threatening to harm her younger siblings and other family members.
35. Some of the acts carried out by children have resulted in their killing or injuring themselves, as well as other civilians. According to Ukrainian authorities, during the reporting period, at least two boys have died, and one boy was injured when handling IEDs.¹⁰ Seven civilians (4 men and 3 women) have been killed or injured during incidents involving explosives built or transported by children.
36. Should these incidents be linked to the armed conflict, such use of children would be in violation of the prohibition in international law on the recruitment or use of children in hostilities.¹¹ The “use” of children has been interpreted to include their use in any capacity, including as fighters and spies.¹² Any use of children in conflict can negatively affect their physical, psychological and emotional well-being.
37. In addition to these risks, children performing the acts described above face detention and criminal prosecution in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian law enforcement authorities, 103 children (91 boys and 12 girls) have been detained,¹³ and as of 31 May 2025, 42 children, including one girl, have been convicted. Out of the 42 convicted children, seven boys were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three years and six months to ten years, while all others were given non-custodial sentences.¹⁴
38. Under international human rights law, the detention of a child should be a measure of last resort, for the shortest period of time, and limited to exceptional cases.¹⁵ Their age, circumstances, and any elements of coercion should be taken into account in any criminal prosecution, with recovery and reintegration as primary considerations.¹⁶ Through nine visits to Ukrainian detention centres holding children and interviews with 16 boys and 2 girls in detention, OHCHR found that the conditions of detention for children were adequate. For at least three of the children OHCHR interviewed in detention, Ukrainian courts subsequently adjusted their orders to allow for house arrest instead of being held in detention centres.

⁹Information received from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine.

¹⁰On 8 February 2025, a 15-year-old boy died in Kharkiv, and on 11 March 2025, a 17-year-old boy died, and a 15-year-old boy was injured in Ivano-Frankivsk.

¹¹CRC, art. 38; Additional Protocol 1, art. 77.

¹²International Criminal Court, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment, 14 March 2012, paras. 619-628; See also Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles), 2007; ICRC Customary IHL Rule 137.

¹³Criminal Code of Ukraine, arts. 111 (treason), 113 (sabotage), 114 (espionage), 114-1 (obstructing the legal activities of the Armed Forces), 194 (property damage), and 258 (terrorist act).

¹⁴Information received from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine.

¹⁵Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37; United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty (Havana Rules), para. 2.

¹⁶OPAC, art. 6(3).

IV. PRISONERS OF WAR


A. Ukrainian POWs held by the Russian Federation

Executions of Ukrainian military personnel captured by Russian armed forces

39. OHCHR has recorded credible allegations of the execution of 106 Ukrainian soldiers captured by the Russian armed forces between late August 2024, when the numbers significantly increased compared to previous periods, and May 2025.¹⁷ Thirty-five of these executions appeared to have occurred in the reporting period. OHCHR assessed the allegations to be credible based on analysis of video and photo material published by Ukrainian and Russian sources, as well as detailed interviews with witnesses.

CREDIBLE ALLEGATIONS OF EXECUTIONS OF UKRAINIAN SOLDIERS CAPTURED BY RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES SINCE LATE AUGUST 2024*

* The infographics demonstrates number of victims



Creation Date: 25 June 2025 Source: OHCHR HRMMU

40. Most of these alleged executions occurred in areas where Russian troops were advancing in Donetsk and Kursk regions. For example, a video showing six Ukrainian POWs being shot one by one by Russian military personnel¹⁸ was published on social media by pro-Russian Telegram channels in January 2025, including by a Russian paramilitary far-right group linked to the Russian armed forces and security entities.¹⁹ The posting of the video was accompanied by statements supporting the perpetrators.
41. Since 24 February 2022, OHCHR has verified the execution of 88 persons *hors de combat* (all men), including Ukrainian POWs by Russian armed forces, including seven since December 2024, and continues to verify additional cases.

Torture, ill-treatment and deaths of Ukrainian POWs held by the Russian Federation

42. Interviews with 117 Ukrainian POWs and two retained medical personnel (118 men, one woman) following their release from Russian captivity confirmed previous patterns of widespread and systematic torture and ill-treatment. The accounts of 48 of them showed that torture continued in the reporting period.²⁰
43. The majority of those interviewed had been held in captivity for more than two years. All but three provided detailed accounts of torture and ill-treatment, describing, for example, severe beatings, stress positions, electric shocks, dog attacks, sexual violence, prolonged standing or exhaustive exercising and humiliation. Some of the interviewees who had remained for extended periods in the same internment facility, either in occupied territory or the Russian Federation, reported a decrease in the severity and frequency of torture and ill-treatment starting in 2024.

¹⁷OHCHR, “41st Periodic Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 September to 30 November 2024”, 31 December 2024.

¹⁸A soldier can be seen wearing a multicam uniform and body armour used by the Russian armed forces.

¹⁹Diversionsary Assault Reconnaissance Group “Rusich”. Since 2022, the group has issued calls for the execution of Ukrainian POWs on social media.

²⁰No Ukrainian servicewomen were exchanged during the reporting period.

44. Starting in late 2024, Russian authorities transferred large groups of POWs from penal colonies in the occupied territory of Ukraine to remote pre-trial detention facilities in the Russian Federation.²¹ Those transferred to such facilities provided consistent accounts of severe beatings, electric shocks, stripping to underwear, sexual violence and humiliation during admission to the new facilities, as well as during daily routines and interrogations. POWs also had to ask for permission to access the toilet and were prohibited from communicating with their families. Interviewees said that penitentiary staff took measures to conceal their identities, such as wearing balaclavas, and avoided disclosing the locations of the facilities to the POWs.
45. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented the deaths of five Ukrainian POWs (all men) that occurred in places of internment between 2022 and 2025 and were attributable to torture, poor conditions of internment, or inadequate medical attention. For example, in March 2024, a Ukrainian POW died three days after he was severely beaten in a facility in the Russian Federation. He had not been hospitalized and died bedridden in his cell. OHCHR has documented the deaths of 25 Ukrainian POWs and one retained medical personnel in Russian captivity since February 2022 under such circumstances.

Prosecution of Ukrainian POWs for mere participation in hostilities

46. During the reporting period, Russian courts convicted at least 125 Ukrainian POWs (all men), captured in Kursk region, on terrorism-related charges.²² The charges were based on acts such as intrusion into Kursk region, building defensive positions, observing movement of Russian troops, attacking Russian troops, and carrying and using weapons – all of which appear to constitute lawful acts of war. Under IHL, individuals entitled to POW status have combatant immunity and cannot be prosecuted for mere participation in hostilities, or for lawful acts of war committed in the course of the international armed conflict, even if such acts would otherwise constitute an offence under domestic law.²³ In a public statement on 12 March 2025, the President of the Russian Federation endorsed the prosecution of Ukrainian POWs for terrorism.²⁴

B. Russian and third-country national POWs held by Ukraine

Executions of Russian military personnel by Ukrainian armed forces

47. In the reporting period, OHCHR verified the execution of one Russian soldier *hors de combat* by a Ukrainian soldier in Donetsk region in late 2024. OHCHR is also following up on the alleged execution of a Russian person *hors de combat* in Kharkiv region in February 2025. OHCHR has verified the execution of 26 persons *hors de combat* (all men), including Russian POWs, by Ukrainian armed forces since February 2022, all except one occurred in 2022 and early 2023.

Torture and ill-treatment of POWs held by Ukraine

48. During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 95 POWs captured by Ukraine, including 21 third-country nationals. Fifty-nine of the POWs described acts of torture and ill-treatment, including beatings with sticks, plastic tubes, electric shocks, dog attacks, excessive physical exercises, death threats, sexual violence, mock execution and humiliation. Most of the acts occurred in transit places before arrival at official places of internment. Eleven interviewees also described beatings during admission, slaps and verbal abuse in official places of internment, which occurred between May 2024 to April 2025. OHCHR also documented the continued use of two unofficial places of internment in or near Kyiv in 2025, where POWs were held *incommunicado* for up to 14 months. In one of these facilities, POWs described being subjected to beatings

²¹The names of the facilities are withheld due to protection concerns. OHCHR is in the process of identifying further facilities.

²²Russian Criminal Code, art. 205, para. 2, (a) and (c), referring to aggravating circumstances of conspiracy or commitment of a criminal act as part of an organized group and acts that lead to significant property damage or other grave consequences.

²³Combatant immunity is a customary doctrine. It is based on the right of combatants to directly participate in hostilities. Additional Protocol I, art. 43, para. 2.

²⁴See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhMH9gAhVNY> (last accessed 14 May 2025) and OHCHR, "Report on the treatment of prisoners of war and update on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 June – 31 August 2024", para. 52, for further information on explicit calls for unlawful treatment of Ukrainian POWs by Russian public figures.

and dog attacks during the so-called 'admission procedure'. They also reported low quality and quantity of food, that caused weight loss and dental problems.

49. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine reported that criminal investigations into the use of torture and ill-treatment at a specific unofficial location of internment in Donetsk region between March and September 2024, as detailed in a previous OHCHR report,²⁵ were ongoing, though no suspects had been identified. In the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed seven additional Russian POWs who were subjected to torture and ill-treatment in the same facility.

Exposure to public curiosity

50. OHCHR documented multiple instances in which images and videos of captured military personnel held by Ukraine were released and subsequently circulated publicly on the internet, including by Ukrainian authorities, and in the media in the reporting period. Some of the videos showed North Korean and Chinese POWs held by Ukrainian authorities. IHL protects POWs from exposure to public curiosity, a term that covers the disclosure of images of POWs, recordings of interrogations, and any other private data. Exposing individual POWs, including third country nationals, may put their lives at risk upon return to their home countries or adversely affect their families.²⁶ At least five POWs interviewed by OHCHR stated that they feared torture or detention if returned to the Russian Federation or their home country.

V. CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

51. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented 106 cases of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) against 94 men, 9 women and 3 girls, perpetrated by members of the Russian armed forces, Russian law enforcement officials, and Russian penitentiary staff. Of these, at least 18 cases occurred during the reporting period. The cases reflect patterns of sexual violence consistent with OHCHR's previous findings.
52. Sexual violence continued to be used as a form of torture and ill-treatment against Ukrainian men in detention in territory occupied by the Russian Federation or in the Russian Federation. OHCHR verified that 85 POWs, two retained medical personnel and six civilian detainees had suffered CRSV, which occurred during different stages of captivity, including rape, genital mutilation, beatings and electric shocks on the genitals, forced nudity, beatings and electric shocks while nude, sexual degradation, and threats of rape, castration or other forms of sexual violence. For example, one Ukrainian POW told OHCHR that between autumn 2022 and summer 2024, he was regularly subjected to beatings on the genitals, forced nudity and beatings while nude in a detention facility in occupied territory. In late December 2024, during the so-called 'admission procedure' in a remote detention facility in the Russian Federation, he was forced to undress and was heavily beaten and electrocuted while nude. In another case, in September 2023, verified by OHCHR during the reporting period, Russian soldiers sexually mutilated and raped a Ukrainian POW they had recently captured and shot him through the anus with a gun, before executing him. OHCHR also documented the case of a civilian man who was arrested by Russian authorities in August 2024 in Zaporizhzhia region and subjected to electric shocks during interrogation, with wires connected to his nipples and genitals.
53. Civilian women and girls faced a heightened risk of sexual violence, in particular rape, in residential areas of occupied territory where Russian armed forces were stationed. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented cases involving rape, gang rape, sexual assault, forced nudity, sexual degradation, sexual harassment and threats of sexual violence perpetrated by Russian soldiers against six women and three girls. For example, in March 2024 in Kherson region, two Russian soldiers dragged a 17-year-old girl who was walking on the street into their car and gang raped her.

²⁵OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 September – 30 November 2024", para. 58.

²⁶Art. 13 (2) of the Third Geneva Convention states that "prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity".

54. In total, since 24 February 2022, OHCHR has documented 484 cases of CRSV perpetrated by Russian authorities against civilians and POWs, including 350 men, 119 women, 13 girls, and 2 boys. Eight men, 43 women, and 9 girls were raped, and of these, 10 women and 4 girls were gang raped. Other forms of sexual violence included attempted rape, genital mutilation, sexual assault, forced nudity, beating or the administration of electric shocks to genitals, and threats of sexual violence.
55. During the reporting period, OHCHR also documented 15 cases of CRSV against Russian and third-country POWs (all men) perpetrated by members of the Ukrainian armed forces, Ukrainian law enforcement officials, and Ukrainian penitentiary staff, primarily in the initial stages of captivity before arrival at official places of internment. Of these, three cases occurred during the reporting period. Forms of sexual violence included beatings and electric shocks to genitals, forced nudity, beatings while nude, and threats of sexual violence. For example, in June 2024, shortly after capture, at an unofficial location in Kharkiv region, a Russian POW was forced to undress and interrogated, while electric shocks were administered simultaneously to his ears, fingers, nipples, and genitals.
56. Overall, since 24 February 2022, OHCHR documented 66 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by Ukrainian authorities against 58 men and 8 women. Sexual violence included one case of attempted rape and one case of sexual assault. Other forms of sexual violence included beatings and electric shocks to genitals, forced nudity, and threats of sexual violence.

VI. HUMAN RIGHTS IN TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

A. Right to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security

Deaths, torture and ill-treatment of Ukrainian civilian detainees

57. During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 21 civilians who had formerly been arrested or detained on occupied territory²⁷ (7 women and 14 men), two of whom were released during the reporting period. Of those, 19 described having endured torture and other forms of ill-treatment in detention, including threat of execution, mock execution, beatings, sexual violence, cutting with knives, waterboarding, electric shocks, lack of medical assistance and dire detention conditions. For example, one man held in administrative detention for alleged curfew violations in Zaporizhzhia region between August and December 2024 reported being subjected to sexual violence as described in para. 52 above. Another released detainee reported that he was beaten and subjected to electric shocks at an official detention site in occupied territory in autumn 2022 and subsequently denied medical care. When he sought medical attention seven months later, following his release, doctors found severe heart damage and a clavicle fracture that had healed incorrectly.
58. In February 2025, Ukrainian authorities reported that the body of Viktoriia Roshchyna, a Ukrainian journalist who went missing in August 2023 from occupied territory, had been returned to Ukraine. Russian officials had informed the family in October 2024 that she had died in custody.²⁸ The Ukrainian authorities have reported that her body bore signs of torture. An additional forensic examination is ongoing to confirm her identity. In February 2025, a Crimean Tatar man died in detention in the Russian Federation while serving an eight-year sentence for participation in an organization designated as “terrorist” by the Russian Federation. Prior to his death, he told his family that he had been subjected to beatings in detention and had developed diabetes and pulmonary oedema. Since February 2022, OHCHR has documented the deaths of 32 Ukrainian civilians (25 men and 7 women) as a result of torture, inadequate medical assistance or inhuman conditions of detention in official and unofficial places of detention in occupied territory and the Russian Federation.

Lack of information on the fate and whereabouts of detainees

²⁷Under IHL, a civilian is any person who is not a member of the armed forces.

²⁸See OHCHR, “Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 September – 30 November 2024”, para. 62.

59. The lack of information regarding the fate and whereabouts of civilian detainees in occupied territory has remained a persistent concern. In many cases, relatives have requested in vain such information from the relevant Russian authorities. Many of these detention cases may amount to enforced disappearances.²⁹ For instance, in early 2025, a teenage boy was arrested in occupied territory. His relatives sought information about him for three weeks before the responsible authorities verbally confirmed that he was alive and facing charges of high treason; the authorities did not, however, disclose his whereabouts, which remained unknown as of May 2025. In another case, the whereabouts of a woman arrested on 25 May 2023 in the occupied territory remained unknown two years after her detention, despite her family's numerous attempts to obtain information from the Russian authorities.

B. Law of occupation

60. In the reporting period, the Russian Federation continued to impose its legal and institutional frameworks in the occupied territory of Ukraine, disregarding the laws in force, in violation of IHL.³⁰
61. The occupying authorities also adopted several new laws and decrees that implicitly or explicitly discriminate against residents of occupied territory who do not hold Russian citizenship or adopt Russian culture and language. For example, one new decree requires Ukrainian residents of the occupied territory to obtain Russian citizenship or legalize their stay according to Russian legislation by 10 September 2025. The procedure includes a requirement to demonstrate knowledge of the Russian language, history and laws.³¹ The decree also repealed previous provisions that, in principle, allowed Ukrainians to access free medical care.³² A set of regional laws made Russian citizenship a requirement, as of 1 January 2025, for residents in occupied territory to receive pensions.³³ Another new law requires citizens from "unfriendly countries" (including Ukraine) to obtain special permits to register property and businesses.³⁴ Another law stipulates that children without Russian citizenship must demonstrate their knowledge of the Russian language before they can be enrolled in educational institutions.³⁵
62. These and similar measures, which discriminate on grounds of nationality, exert pressure on residents of occupied territory to obtain Russian citizenship, in violation of the prohibition on an occupying Power to require the local population to swear allegiance to it under IHL.³⁶ In March 2025, Russian authorities announced that they had issued Russian passports to 3.5 million people in occupied territory. Many individuals from occupied territory interviewed by OHCHR stated that they had acquired Russian citizenship because they had no other viable option.
63. The Russian Federation also violated its obligation not to forcibly transfer within or deport individuals from occupied territory to the Russian Federation or a third country.³⁷ Russian authorities continued to deport civilian detainees from occupied territory to the Russian Federation.³⁸ For example, an OSCE Ukrainian national staff member from Luhansk region, who was convicted on 'espionage' charges in 2024, was deported to a remote

²⁹See OHCHR, "Detention of civilians in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, 24 February 2022 – 23 May 2023", para. 68.

³⁰Hague Regulations, Art. 43; Geneva Convention IV, Art. 64.

³¹Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 20 March 2025, № 159 available at <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202503200022>

³²OHCHR has previously documented that access to medical care in reality was limited for residents without Russian citizenship. OHCHR, "Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 March – 31 May 2024", July 2024, para. 44.

³³Decree No. 679 by the Donetsk occupying authorities, 12 December 2024; Decree No. 147-I by Luhansk occupying authorities, 3 April 2025; Decree No. 139-u by the Kherson occupying authorities, 19 December 2024; Decree No. 310-u by the Zaporizhzhia occupying authorities, 13 September 2024.

³⁴Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 14 March 2025, № 145, available at <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202503140012> until 1 January 2028

³⁵Russian Federal law № 544-ФЗ, 28 December 2024, available at <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202412280045>

³⁶Geneva Convention IV, art. 45.

³⁷Geneva Convention IV, Art. 49 (1).

³⁸Geneva Convention IV, Art. 76

penal colony in the Russian Federation in March 2025. Former Ukrainian POWs interviewed by OHCHR who had been transferred to remote pre-trial detention facilities in the Russian Federation reported that there were both POWs and civilians among those transferred. In addition to being prohibited under IHL, deporting detainees from the occupied territory to the Russian Federation increases the risk of enforced disappearances and affects the right to a family life (see para. 59).

64. On 1 April 2025, the Russian Federation launched a spring conscription campaign, which included occupied territory,³⁹ in violation of its IHL obligation not to compel residents of an occupied territory to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces.⁴⁰ The Russian Federation also conducted propaganda to encourage ‘voluntary’ enlistment in its armed forces in occupied territory, which violates IHL.⁴¹ Information campaigns highlighted financial incentives of 400,000 roubles (approximately USD 5,000) for those signing a contract with the Russian armed forces to participate in the “special military operation” in Ukraine, the term used by the Russian authorities to describe the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.⁴²

Housing, land and property rights

65. In the reporting period, the occupying authorities accelerated efforts to expropriate “abandoned” residential property in occupied territory, using laws adopted in 2023 and 2024.⁴³ IHL prohibits the occupying Power from confiscating private property.⁴⁴
66. The occupying authorities posted notifications concerning at least 16,295 potentially abandoned properties, both on doors and via official websites, in the reporting period, a 63 per cent increase compared with the previous six months. Many are owned by individuals who fled to territory controlled by Ukraine. The highest numbers of such notifications were listed in Donetsk, Kherson and Luhansk regions. In Mariupol alone, at least 12,191 apartments were listed as potentially abandoned between December 2024 and May 2025. In total, OHCHR has documented the listing of nearly 30,000 properties as potentially abandoned since the relevant laws were adopted in 2023 and 2024.

³⁹Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 31 March 2025, № 187, available at <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202503310001>

⁴⁰Geneva Convention IV, Art. 51


⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, 31 July 2024, № 644, available at <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202407310001>

⁴³See OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 March – 31 May 2024, July 2024, paras. 48-50; OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 September – 30 November 2024, December 2024, paras. 81-83.

⁴⁴Hague Regulations, art. 46; Geneva Convention IV, art. 47.

NOTIFICATIONS OF POTENTIALLY "ABANDONED" RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES ISSUED BY RUSSIAN OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES REGARDING **29,556** APARTMENTS AND HOUSES



Source: OHCHR HRMMU

67. The publication of a notice that a residential property is potentially abandoned triggers a 30-day period for the owner to confirm ownership or risk having the property transferred to the local administration. It is, however, difficult or impossible for many individuals, even if they are aware of such a notice, to comply with the requirements for confirming ownership.
68. The requirement for property owners to present themselves in person to confirm ownership poses significant logistical challenges and potential security risks for those residing outside occupied territory.⁴⁵ As there are no crossing points along the frontline, the only available route for Ukrainian citizens to return to the occupied territory is through the Russian Federation, where they are subjected to often extensive questioning by border officials, and inspection of their electronic devices.
69. Russian authorities have denied entry to numerous residents of occupied territory. For example, OHCHR interviewed five women originally from occupied territory who were denied entry to the Russian Federation, and consequently to occupied territory, on separate occasions, and were issued entry bans of up to 50 years. Several individuals interviewed by OHCHR stated they would not travel to occupied territory due to fears of being detained for their actual or perceived pro-Ukrainian views or connections to members of the Ukrainian armed forces.
70. The practice of requiring people to present a passport of the Russian Federation has also prevented Ukrainians without Russian citizenship from confirming ownership of their property.⁴⁶
71. In cases where owners are unable or unwilling to confirm ownership, a Russian-appointed court in occupied territory can transfer ownership of the property to local authorities. OHCHR is not aware of any publicly available records indicating the number of properties that have been transferred to local authorities. The

⁴⁵See OHCHR, Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 September – 30 November 2024, para. 81.

⁴⁶The requirement to present a passport of the Russian Federation is explicit in legislation and instructions in occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region. See, for example, instructions on the official site of the occupying authorities of the Zaporizhzhia region: https://zo.gov.ru/news/show_group/vyyavlennoe_besxozhaynoe_imushchestvo. OHCHR has also documented that this requirement is in practice in other regions.

occupying authorities had earlier announced their intention to use expropriated properties to accommodate “incoming specialists” from the Russian Federation.⁴⁷

72. In the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine (“Crimea”), courts of the occupying authorities continued to “order” persons without Russian citizenship, including Ukrainian citizens, to relinquish land ownership, relying on a 2020 decree of the Russian Federation that declared significant parts of Crimea a “border territory”, thereby restricting land ownership in those areas to citizens of the Russian Federation.⁴⁸ For example, in December 2024, a Russian-appointed court in Sevastopol ordered a Ukrainian citizen to relinquish ownership of his property because he did not hold Russian citizenship.⁴⁹

C. Freedom of expression, opinion, assembly and religion

73. On 28 December 2024, the Russian Federation adopted a State strategy on countering extremism that identified “Ukrainian nationalism” as a form of extremism and described “extremism in Ukraine” as a threat to national security.⁵⁰ OHCHR has documented that the occupying authorities have sanctioned people simply for expressing their Ukrainian identity or showing perceived support for Ukraine. For example, in February 2024, the occupying authorities detained a woman in Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia region, for posting pictures of pro-Ukrainian symbols on social media. She was found guilty of disseminating “extremist materials”, an administrative offense as defined under Russian law.⁵¹
74. The occupying authorities also charged people with the offenses of “displaying Nazi symbols or showing disrespect for the Russian state” for expressing their identity as Ukrainians or dissenting political views. In Crimea, where court records are publicly available, Russian-appointed courts convicted 50 people (21 women and 29 men) for acts that OHCHR assessed as constituting legitimate exercises of their freedom of expression, including, for example, posting pictures containing Ukrainian national symbols or colours on social media, advocating respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and calling on all parties to resume negotiations.
75. Occupying authorities also used other legal provisions to punish dissent, including criticism of the occupying authorities and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to public court records, Russian-appointed courts in Crimea convicted 311 individuals (217 women and 94 men) for the administrative offence of “discrediting the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” during the reporting period.⁵² One woman was fined 30,000 roubles (USD 370) for posting on social media that the time had come for the two parties to engage in dialogue.
76. Occupying authorities continued to restrict access to independent media and information. On 11 February 2025, the Russian-appointed governor of the occupied areas of Kherson region signed a decree prohibiting the purchase and use of “unlicensed” satellite television equipment for receiving foreign broadcasts. The stated purpose of the decree was to “prevent the spread of false information.”⁵³ One woman told OHCHR that the Russian armed forces checked whether residents were watching Ukrainian television channels or using satellite dishes capable of receiving them, in line with this decree.
77. The occupying authorities also continued to target members of specific religious organizations in occupied territory. In January 2025, a Russian-appointed court in Crimea sentenced two men to six years in prison on charges of “organizing the activities of an extremist organization” for conducting and participating in worship

⁴⁷ Available at: <https://t.me/mizozap/2359> (accessed 19 May 2025).

⁴⁸ Available at: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202003200021?index=4&rangeSize=1>.

⁴⁹ Available at https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/proc_92/search?article=99931292.

⁵⁰ See Decree No. 1124 of the President of the Russian Federation dated 28 December 2024, paras. 6, 14, and 20-24.

⁵¹ Article 20.3.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, Part 1.

⁵² During the previous six months, OHCHR documented 196 convictions under discreditation charges.

⁵³ Decree of the ‘governor’ of occupied Kherson region, No. 17-u, dated 11 February 2025, available at: <https://khogov.ru/documents/ukaz-gubernatora-hersonskoj-oblasti-ot-11-02-2025-%E2%84%96-17-u-o-zaprete-ispolzovaniya-na-territorii-hersonskoj-oblasti-komplektov-sputnikovogo-televideniya-ne-prednaznachennyh-dlya-raboty-v/>

gatherings of Jehovah's Witnesses. In February 2025, Russian authorities arrested five Crimean Tatar men on suspicion of membership in the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir and charged them with organizing and participating in a terrorist organization. Both Jehovah's Witnesses and Hizb ut-Tahrir are banned in the Russian Federation, but not under Ukrainian law. As of 1 May 2025, organisations affiliated with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine or Jehovah's Witnesses were not registered in occupied territory.⁵⁴ Under the law of the Russian Federation, individuals and communities are required to notify the authorities of their existence or formally register if they conduct missionary activities or own religious buildings.⁵⁵

D. Right to family life

78. In the reporting period, numerous residents of occupied territory, as well as residents of Government-controlled territory who have relatives living in occupied territory interviewed by OHCHR have highlighted the emotional distress and suffering caused by prolonged family separation resulting from the occupation. Extensive displacement due to hostilities has left many families divided across the frontline.
79. Several actions and policies by the Russian Federation have exacerbated these difficulties, with additional negative consequences for the right to family life.⁵⁶ Strict entry restrictions imposed by Russian authorities on Ukrainian citizens seeking to enter the Russian Federation and therefore occupied territory, have compounded the logistical and financial difficulties of returning to or visiting the occupied territory.⁵⁷
80. For those who attempt to return but are denied entry by the Russian authorities, the impact on their family lives can be profound. As previously mentioned, some individuals have been issued entry bans of up to 50 years. One woman expressed deep distress at the prospect of never seeing her grandmother again, whom she described as the closest person in her life. Another woman voiced concern about being unable to return to take care of her elderly father, who has mobility impairment, and her mother, who had her leg amputated due to a shelling-related injury.
81. Family ties have also been disrupted and severed by unlawful deportations of residents of occupied territory to detention facilities located several thousand kilometres away in the Russian Federation. For example, the family of a civilian detainee had no information about his whereabouts for seven months. After he was deported to the Russian Federation, he was only able to call his family four times over the course of a year.
82. The severance of family ties has also been exacerbated by the restrictions on freedom of expression and extensive surveillance of communications in occupied territory.⁵⁸ Many individuals interviewed by OHCHR in Government-controlled territory reported that they did not feel safe communicating with their family members in occupied territory via mobile networks and social media, fearing that their relatives could be targeted either for statements made during conversations or simply for maintaining contact with people residing in territory controlled by Ukraine.

VII. HUMAN RIGHTS IN GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TERRITORY

A. Administration of justice

Treatment and prosecution of conflict-related detainees

⁵⁴OHCHR reviewed data on registered religious organizations from the Russian Ministry of Justice available at <https://minjust.gov.ru/ru/pages/reestr-nekommercheskih-organizacij/>.

⁵⁵See https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/ru/web/proc_50/activity/legal-education/explain?item=4920522.

⁵⁶Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, art. 74; Geneva Convention IV, arts. 25-26; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 34; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), art. 10.


⁵⁷See para. 68 above.

⁵⁸See OHCHR report "Human rights situation during the Russian occupation of territory of Ukraine and its aftermath (24 February 2022 – 31 December 2023)", from para. 50.

83. In the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 56 individuals (33 men, 14 women, 8 boys, 1 girl) detained by Ukrainian authorities on charges of state treason, “collaboration” and other national security-related crimes in seven official facilities.⁵⁹ Eleven of them described beatings and threats during arrest or interrogation, and one person described deprivation of sleep during the first days of detention; these acts occurred between 2022 and 2025. Overall, since 24 February 2022, OHCHR documented the torture or ill-treatment of 170 conflict-related detainees (132 men, 35 women, 3 boys). The majority of violations occurred in 2022.

VERDICTS IN CASES OF “COLLABORATION ACTIVITIES” (ART. 111-1 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF UKRAINE)

From 1 December 2024 to 31 May 2025



Creation Date: 25 June 2025 Source: OHCHR HRMMU

84. OHCHR has previously documented that many individuals prosecuted for “collaboration activities” were prosecuted for actions that could lawfully be compelled by the occupying Power under IHL.⁶⁰ In the reporting period, through analysis of court decisions, OHCHR assessed that 51 of the 624 individuals who were convicted fell into this category, continuing a downward trend in the number of these cases since 2024, as compared to 2022 and 2023.

B. Freedom of religion

85. At least 11 men from Jehovah’s Witnesses and Baptist communities claimed conscientious objection in the reporting period, but were nevertheless charged with evading military service, refusing to follow military orders, or desertion.⁶¹ In April 2025, the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision to sentence a conscientious objector from the Jehovah’s Witnesses community to three years of imprisonment for evading military service, arguing that the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on conscientious

⁵⁹Criminal Code of Ukraine, arts. 109-114, 258-258, 260, and 436-442.

⁶⁰For further analysis, see OHCHR report “Human rights situation during the Russian occupation of territory of Ukraine and its aftermath (24 February 2022 – 31 December 2023)”.

⁶¹Criminal Code of Ukraine, arts. 336, 402 and 407.

objection was not relevant for such a large-scale war as waged against Ukraine.⁶² This decision runs counter to international human rights law, which does not provide for such qualifications; indeed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right of conscientious objection to military service allows no restrictions or derogation.⁶³

86. In addition, nine conscientious objectors interviewed by OHCHR provided detailed accounts of torture and ill-treatment during apprehension, in territorial conscription centres or after being forcibly taken to military units. In one case, military personnel beat a conscientious objector, strapped his hands behind his back for a prolonged period of time, threatened him with execution, and withheld food for 11 days for his refusal to wear his military uniform.
87. During the reporting period, OHCHR also documented further attacks against members and supporters of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC). On 9 April 2025, in the village of Verkhni Stanivtsi, Chernivtsi region, a group of unidentified individuals attempted to seize a church building of the UOC and attacked parishioners in the process, using wooden sticks, pepper spray and rods. The UOC reported injuries among its adherents. Three days later, a similar attack resulted in the UOC parishioners having to leave the church; they have not been able to return as of the end of the reporting period. According to witnesses, police present during the second incident did not appear to take action to prevent and respond to violent actions.⁶⁴

C. Economic, social and cultural rights

Evacuations of older persons and persons with disabilities from frontline areas

88. Field visits to high-risk areas and interviews with local authorities of frontline communities confirmed that many residents remaining in frontline areas are older persons and persons with disabilities. For example, according to a local government official in Kherson city, 50,000 of the city's current population of 80,000 are older than 55 years. As a result, older persons are also disproportionately represented among those killed and injured in these areas. In the reporting period, OHCHR documented that persons aged 60 years and above accounted for more than 41 per cent of the civilian casualties in frontline areas, although they constitute 25 per cent of the general population of Ukraine.⁶⁵ State institutions, humanitarian organizations and community networks faced significant risks in delivering support, given the attacks on humanitarian and medical workers described above (see para. 24). As a result, assistance and services were frequently unavailable in these dangerous areas.
89. During the reporting period, OHCHR conducted 14 visits to transit centres and collective centres, 12 interviews with staff of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) conducting evacuations and 79 interviews with IDPs. While there are several reasons why older persons and persons with disabilities are not able or willing to evacuate from frontline areas, those interviewed by OHCHR often cited limited financial resources, inability to afford private housing in safer areas, and uncertainty about where they would relocate. For example, a 65-year-old woman who had been evacuated from Pokrovsk, Donetsk region, in September 2024 told OHCHR that many people remained in the town despite the deteriorating security situation because they could not afford to live elsewhere with a monthly pension of 3,000 to 4,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (approximately USD 70 to 100).
90. A major challenge reported by NGOs conducting the evacuation of older persons and persons with disabilities from frontline areas is that transit centres often lack accessible facilities and specialized staff who can provide the necessary support. NGOs primarily provide support for older persons and persons with disabilities in this context. For example, for evacuees with disabilities from Donetsk region, there is only one private transit centre

⁶²Unified State Register of Court Decisions of Ukraine, Case No. 573/406/24, decision dated 15 April 2025, available at: <https://reyestr.court.gov.ua/Review/126906863>.

⁶³International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 18 and 4. Ukraine ratified the Covenant on 12 November 1973. See also A/HRC/56/30 paras. 5-6, citing relevant decisions of the Human Rights Committee.

⁶⁴See also "OHCHR Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 September to 30 November 2024", para. 89.

⁶⁵Based on records for which the age is known.

with accessible facilities and specialized staff, located in Dnipropetrovsk region, which is funded primarily by NGOs. Some regions through which evacuees pass, for instance Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa regions, do not have any such transit centres.

91. State-provided long-term accommodation centres, such as collective centres and dormitories, also often do not have accessible facilities. About 70 per cent of collective centres across Ukraine do not have accessible facilities, such as bomb shelters, bathrooms and toilets.⁶⁶ At the same time, private housing in cities receiving evacuees remains unaffordable, especially for older persons on low pensions. In the transit centre in Dnipropetrovsk region, for instance, this resulted in evacuees with disabilities staying there for two months on average because they had to wait for NGO staff to find appropriate long-term accommodation for them or resolve issues of documentation.
92. In addition, persons with disabilities and older persons are at greater risk of being placed in institutions where they are unable to exercise their right to live independently and be included in the community. The obligations to uphold these rights cannot be suspended in times of emergency.⁶⁷ A representative of an NGO conducting evacuations told OHCHR that the majority of persons with disabilities and older persons who previously lived independently were placed in institutions after evacuation, and expressed concerns that they could remain there indefinitely.
93. The lack of accessible and dignified long-term housing in safer areas also led to significant delays in the evacuation of older persons and persons with disabilities in institutions. For example, OHCHR documented that in Sumy region, two care institutions for older persons and persons with disabilities had still not been evacuated as of 31 May 2025, despite legislation requiring evacuation of all facilities within 50 kilometres of the border with the Russian Federation.⁶⁸

VIII. ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPARATIONS

Domestic legislation regarding reparations

94. The parliament of Ukraine adopted three laws in the reporting period concerning aspects of reparations. Law no. 3999-IX⁶⁹ focuses on children affected by the armed conflict. It defines different categories of children who suffered harm as a result of armed conflict, establishes a national register for recording this harm, and extends social support services to such children, as well as the right to compensation. Law no. 4071-IX⁷⁰ requires the creation of a database to record damage caused to personal non-property rights of individuals as a result of the armed conflict. The database will consolidate information on various types of damages and inform Government support measures. Law no. 4067-IX⁷¹ focuses on interim reparations for victims of CRSV. It guarantees victims free rehabilitation, including a set of medical, psychosocial and other measures, and the right to one-time financial support.

⁶⁶CCCM Cluster, "Ukraine Collective Site Monitoring, Round 15", 25 February 2025, pp. 16, 18.

⁶⁷See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, "General Comment No. 5 on Article 19" and "Guidelines on deinstitutionalization, including in emergencies", paras. 6-8.

⁶⁸Cabinet of Ministers, Decree No. 546 on the temporary relocation of children and persons residing in institutions, 1 June 2023, and OHCHR, "Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 September – 30 November 2024", December 2024, para. 24.

⁶⁹Law "On Social Protection and Support for Children Affected by the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine to Streamline the Provision of Social Services and Benefits", 8 October 2024, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3999-20#Text>

⁷⁰Law "On Accounting for Information on Damage Caused to the Personal Non-Property Rights of Individuals as a Result of Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine", 20 November 2024, available at: <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4071-IX#Text>

⁷¹Law "On Legal and Social Protection of Persons Affected by Sexual Violence Related to the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine and Providing them with Immediate Interim Reparations", 20 November 2024, at <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4067-IX#Text>

95. On 19 December 2024, Parliament adopted legal amendments that introduced the possibility of people obtaining compensation for property that was damaged or destroyed in areas of active hostilities and occupied territory of Ukraine.⁷² However, the President of Ukraine had not signed the law as of 31 May 2025.

Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine

96. Within the reporting period, the Register of Damage for Ukraine established by the Council of Europe began accepting victims' claims relating to several violations against personal integrity. In addition, in March 2025, formal treaty negotiations began on the creation of a claims commission that would review claims on their merits and award damages.
97. OHCHR notes that on 7 February 2025 the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation declared the Register of Damage an "undesirable organization" on its territory.⁷³ As a result, the Registry is banned from disseminating information in the Russian Federation, and Russian citizens are prohibited from participating in its activities. Violations are punishable with up to six years imprisonment and 500,000 Russian roubles (approximately USD 6,000) fines. OHCHR is concerned that this declaration will limit and obstruct the submission of claims for damages from residents of occupied territory, thereby hindering effective access to reparations.

Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine

98. Since 2022, negotiations have been ongoing to establish an *ad hoc* international tribunal to prosecute the senior political and military leadership of the Russian Federation responsible for planning, preparing, initiating, or executing the crime of aggression against Ukraine.⁷⁴ In March, the technical work on the draft legal instruments necessary to establish the Tribunal within the framework of the Council of Europe was completed.

IX. TECHNICAL COOPERATION AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

99. During the reporting period, OHCHR provided training to 25 prosecutors from different offices across Ukraine on IHL standards relating to the issue of collaboration.
100. OHCHR provided technical advice to participants during two workshops by the Team of Experts of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict for the National Police and the Security Service of Ukraine. The first was on trauma-informed interviewing of survivors of CRSV and the second on strengthening investigations into this type of violence.
101. Building on the report of the Office on the impact of the hostilities and occupation on children's rights,⁷⁵ OHCHR together with the Office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, engaged with the authorities on detailed recommendations regarding the protection of children living in occupied territory and displaced from there. OHCHR provided technical analysis on grave violations against children in times of war for the 2024 annual report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict.
102. On 25 April 2025, OHCHR conducted a training on the international legal framework concerning the rights of children and persons with disabilities for 40 participants – including teachers, parents, and girls with disabilities – during an event dedicated to developing leadership skills among girls with disabilities.

⁷²Law no. 11161 introducing amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On compensation for damage and destruction of certain categories of immovable property as a result of hostilities, terrorist acts, sabotage caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, and the State Register of property damaged and destroyed as a result of hostilities, terrorist acts, sabotage caused by the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine".

⁷³See, Prosecutor's General Office of the Russian Federation, available at: https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/eng_gprf/mass-media/news?item=101243296

⁷⁴The ICC lacks jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and Ukraine is unable to prosecute Russian leadership due to 'head of state immunity'.

⁷⁵OHCHR, "The impact of the armed conflict and occupation on children's rights in Ukraine", March 2025.

X. RECOMMENDATIONS

103. OHCHR continues to advocate for the implementation of recommendations in its past reports, most of which remain relevant. The violations documented in the current reporting period highlight the need for further progress in protecting human rights, and, in particular, to implement the following recommendations:
104. To all parties to the conflict:
- (a) Take all feasible precautions to avoid or at the very least minimize civilian harm, including through the careful selection of means and methods of warfare and target verification; refrain from using explosive weapons with wide area effects, including cluster munitions, in populated areas;
 - (b) Ensure prompt, impartial and effective investigations into all alleged violations of IHL and international human rights law (IHRL) and ensure that alleged perpetrators, including members of the military and security forces and persons in positions of command are duly prosecuted; and provide reparations and support to victims, including medical, psychological and legal support services, with particular attention to the specific needs of women, girls, men and boys;
 - (c) Cease practices of exposing POWs to public curiosity by recording and publishing videos of them and take into account fears of harm or persecution in the country of return, when deciding on exchange or repatriation of POWs;
 - (d) Negotiate the establishment of humanitarian corridors across the frontline to facilitate family reunification and allow people to access their property.
105. To the Russian Federation:
- (e) Immediately cease the use of armed force against Ukraine and withdraw military forces from the territory of Ukraine, as per United Nations General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 on the "Aggression against Ukraine", adopted on 2 March 2022, and in line with the binding order of the International Court of Justice on provisional measures of 16 March 2022 for the Russian Federation to immediately suspend the military operation;
 - (f) Immediately cease attacks with explosive weapons in populated areas;
 - (g) Immediately cease, prevent, and publicly condemn the summary execution, torture, ill-treatment and sexual violence against POWs and civilian detainees, and end all unlawful practices relating to detention and ensure that POWs and civilian detainees are treated in full compliance with IHL and IHRL; provide independent and impartial monitors full and regular access to all places where Ukrainian POWs and civilian detainees are held and expand the practice of monitoring visits and inspections by national human rights institutions and high level officials;
 - (h) Respect the right of POWs to communicate with the outside world, in particular, by giving them regular access to modern means of communication; provide timely information about their status of health and whereabouts, including upon each transfer between places of internment;
 - (i) Respect the combatant immunity of Ukrainian POWs and cease prosecutions under terrorism charges for acts that amount to mere participation in hostilities;
 - (j) Ensure safeguards for Ukrainian civilian detainees, including the prompt provision of information about the reasons for their detention, periodic review of detention decisions, access to effective appeal procedures, access to lawyers of their choice, and release as soon as the reasons for their deprivation of liberty cease to exist in accordance with international law; cease the practice of deporting civilian detainees to detention facilities in the Russian Federation;
 - (k) Fulfil its obligations under IHL in the territory under its occupation to restore and ensure the public order and civil life that existed prior to occupation, including by respecting Ukrainian laws and institutions unless absolutely prevented from doing so;

- (l) Ensure that the freedoms of expression and opinion, religion and belief can be freely exercised without discrimination by all individuals and groups living in the occupied territory of Ukraine;
- (m) Remove the Register of Damage for Ukraine from its list of “undesirable organizations”;
- (n) Strengthen cooperation and dialogue with OHCHR, including by providing OHCHR with meaningful access to the occupied territory and affected areas in the Russian Federation;
- (o) Investigate claims of Russian State actors recruiting and using children in the context of the armed conflict by soliciting them via social media to carry out acts of surveillance, sabotage and terrorism against property, premises and members of Ukrainian armed forces and other State bodies of Ukraine.

106. To Ukraine:

- (p) Immediately cease and prevent the torture and ill-treatment of POWs and conflict-related detainees held by Ukraine;
- (q) Ensure that law enforcement takes timely measures to prevent and immediately suppress violence among religious communities and brings perpetrators to account regardless of their affiliation;
- (r) Fully respect the right of conscientious objection to military service in accordance with article 18 of the ICCPR;
- (s) Bring the law on collaboration activities in line with IHL and IHRL, and refrain from prosecuting individuals for conduct that can be lawfully compelled by the occupying Power under IHL;
- (t) Increase efforts to evacuate older persons and persons with disabilities from unsafe areas, and take necessary measures to guarantee their right to live independently, including by ensuring affordable and accessible housing and community-based services;
- (u) Strengthen efforts to raise awareness in educational settings about the use of children in armed conflict, including through developing and conducting workshops for educational personnel and children.

107. To the international community:

- (v) Continue to urge the parties to the conflict to fully respect IHRL and IHL, demand and work collectively to ensure accountability, including reparation for the victims of violations, and take all necessary measures to prevent further violations;
- (w) Call for OHCHR and other independent human rights monitors to have the fullest possible access to all areas of Ukraine occupied by the Russian Federation, including places of internment and detention, in order to facilitate comprehensive monitoring and accountability;
- (x) Provide support to NGOs that conduct and facilitate the evacuation of persons with disabilities and older persons; provide support, technical assistance and capacity building to help Ukraine speed up deinstitutionalization and implement long-term accommodation solutions that fully consider the needs of evacuated older persons and persons with disabilities.